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ABSTRACT
Old and environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent
regulations and are slow to adopt new and cleaner technologies.  This paper explains the
lobbying success of these industries in terms of the strategic role of investment as a credible
commitment device.  It is demonstrated that if governments are predisposed to special interest
groups, underinvestment in new technology enables firms to lobby more effectively.  Such
industries are shown to be better placed to extract policy concessions, despite contributing less to
the government in political donations.  The analysis therefore suggests that political
considerations may provide a significant incentive for firms to reject environmentally beneficial
investments, even when these lower production costs.
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A growing body of empirical literature suggests that older industries often
form highly effective lobby groups, which resist reforms such as the introduction of
environmental regulations, or the elimination of trade barriers.
i  Moreover, while
successful in lobbying, such industries have often been slow to adopt cleaner and
more efficient technologies.  This observation has lead some commentators to argue
that investment in environmental damage control can be profitable, in the sense that a
firm can more than offset the initial investment through cost savings.
   For instance,
Porter and Linde [27] provocatively assert that:
“Actual experience with environmental investments illustrates that in the real
world, $10 bills are waiting to be picked up.”
 ii
This paper seeks to explore the reasons why environmentally damaging
industries appear to be more successful at securing policy concessions and are often
slow to embrace new technologies.  We propose a novel explanation, which focuses
upon the role of investment in technology as a credible commitment device.  It is
shown that the lobbying success of an industry depends critically upon its prior
investment strategy.  Firms that underinvest in “clean” technologies, can lobby more
successfully for policy concessions.  This occurs because underinvestment in new
technology acts as a credible commitment device, which makes environmental reform
difficult for the government and thus renders lobbying more effective.  In what
follows, we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in which firms may reject cost
saving investments in order to elicit a favourable response from the government.
The analysis is based on a simple framework, which deals with the problem of
pollution control.  We consider a firm which emits pollution that adversely effects a
subset of individuals in the economy.
iii  In order to control the level of pollution the4
government levies an emissions tax on the firm.  The resulting emission levels depend
upon the degree of environmental regulation (i.e. the tax rate) and the level of
investment in pollution abatement equipment.
Lobbying is introduced into this framework by drawing on the model of
political competition developed by Grossman and Helpman [18], and extended by
Fredriksson [15].  Accordingly, it is assumed that a self-interested government cares
not only about aggregate welfare, but also political contributions received from lobby
groups.  Political donations influence the government’s decisions because of their
many uses, including funding election campaigns, retiring debt from previous
elections and deterring rivals.  It is assumed that the firm seeks to minimize its tax
burden by offering political contributions to the government, which are contingent on
the emission tax policy implemented.  The government in turn, selects the policy that
maximizes its own welfare.  Since the analysis focuses upon the effects of lobbying by
polluters, the role of an opposing environmental lobby group is suppressed.  This may
be justified by assuming that pollution damage is so widely dispersed that it does not
induce the affected individuals to form a lobby group.  In the parlance of Baron [5]
this represents a particularist policy, where the benefits of a tax concession are
concentrated, but the environmental costs are so thinly spread that they do not provide
sufficient incentive for individuals to organize a lobby group, or make political
donations.
As noted by Grossman and Helpman [18] this approach to modelling political
lobbying is well suited to analyse the precise details of policies which are likely to be
adopted by a government.  The longer-term impact of policies on the election outcome
is ignored, on the assumption that the incumbent government has some measure of
flexibility in making policy choices.  The analysis may therefore be viewed as5
focusing upon the short-term determinants of policies, within a given political and
economic structure.
We assume the following sequence of events.  In the first stage, the firm
chooses a pollution abatement technology.  The second stage determines the political
equilibrium, in which the firm selects a contribution schedule and the government sets
the emission tax rate.  In the final stage the firm sets output and abatement levels.
 iv
This paper extends the existing literature by exploring the impact of firm
investment on environmental policy outcomes.  We consider a situation in which
firms can choose between a continuum of pollution abatement technologies, which
differ in their associated abatement costs.  Not unrealistically, it is assumed that
technologies which are more efficient, in the sense that they abate a given amount of
pollution at lower cost, necessitate higher levels of investment.
v  The technologies can
therefore be ranked, since the pollution abatement costs for one technology are lower
(higher) than they are for another.  It is demonstrated that if the government values
political donations, underinvestment in pollution abatement technology enables firms
to lobby more effectively for a lower pollution tax.  Intuitively, this reflects the fact
that in a political equilibrium, the tax rate which is set by the government depends on
the level of political contributions, and the welfare costs of the chosen policy.  By
adopting a less efficient abatement technology, the firm raises the cost of reducing
pollution and thus renders a pollution tax less effective.
vi  Pollution control is made
more difficult for the government to achieve and the firm therefore needs to spend less
on lobbying.
In deciding on whether to invest in more efficient pollution abatement
equipment, the firm will trade off the benefits which accrue in the form of lower
production costs, against the need to spend more on lobbying.  Lobbying can therefore6
be seen to diminish the gains from investment.  In the parlance of the strategic
investment literature (e.g., [16]), there is an incentive to adopt the “puppy dog”
strategy – the firm underinvests to remain weak and inefficient in order to induce a
less hostile response from the government.  Thus, by credibly committing to less
efficient technologies in earlier stages of the game, the polluter can rig in its favor the
ensuing political equilibrium.
It is important to note that these results do not imply that environmental
instruments, such as emission taxes, will be ineffective in controlling pollution.
vii
Instead the analysis suggests that when governments place a high value on political
contributions, then stringent environmental regulations will be more successfully
resisted by older and less efficient firms.  The model therefore predicts that such
industries will have greater success in securing policy concessions and support than
other sectors.
viii  If, however, the government were indifferent to lobbyists and
introduced stringent environmental controls, these regulations would have the usual
effect of reducing environmental damage.
There is a substantial theoretical literature which examines the role of policy
instruments on the incentives firms face to adopt new pollution abatement
technologies.  However, this work has neglected the role of lobbying on technology
adoption.
ix  Similarly, the growing body of literature on rent seeking, deals with the
effects of lobbying on the policy outcome, and has ignored the role of firm investment
in a political equilibrium.  This paper attempts to augment both the rent seeking and
the environmental technology literature, by exploring the manner in which investment
decisions can influence policy outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the
basic structure of the model, while section 3 derives the political equilibrium and7
describes the manner in which investment influences political contributions.  Section
4 deals with the problem of investment and outlines the circumstances under which
lobbying diminishes the incentive to invest in new technology.  Section 5 discusses
empirical issues, qualifications, extensions of the model and concludes the paper.
2.  THE MODEL
We consider an economy with two sectors: a competitive numeraire sector and
a monopoly which produces a polluting good.  The demand side of the economy is
modelled as in Singh and Vives [28].  There are two types of individuals in the
economy.  Consumers (C) who consume both the numeraire good and the





C + u(Q) - PQ (1a)
where x
C is their consumption of the numeraire good, Q is output of the monopoly and
P is the price of good Q.  It is assumed that ∂ u/∂ Q > 0 and ∂
2u/∂ Q
2 < 0.
Production of good Q results in pollution emissions, denoted E, which
adversely effect a subset of individuals termed environmentalists (en).  The pollution
damage suffered by environmentalists is defined by the damage function D(E), with
∂ D/∂ E > 0 and ∂
2D/∂ E
2 > 0.  Environmentalists consume only the numeraire good and
none of the polluting firm’s output, since they recognize the impact of their own
consumption on pollution levels.  The utility of the environmentalists is given by
U
en = x
en - D(E)  (1b)
From the demand function implied by (1a) we assume:
Q
) Q ( P
∂
∂
 < 0  (2)8
As noted earlier, production of good Q results in pollution emissions.  For
simplicity we suppose that in the absence of pollution abatement, the emissions are
proportional to output levels and defined by:
E
T = θ Q, (3)
where θ  > 0, is the emission coefficient of output
xi.
The government levies a tax on pollution emissions at a rate t.  As is well
known, emission taxes provide firms with an incentive to abate emissions.  Following
Conrad [7] we assume that the cost function denoted C(Q, c, v(a,τ ), t) contains three
distinct components: (i) the production costs (c), (ii) the cost of abating emissions
v(a,τ ), which depends on the degree of abatement activity (a) and the type of pollution
abatement equipment used (τ ) and (iii) the tax paid on unabated emissions (t). The
cost function is given by:
C(Q, c, v(a,τ ), t) =  [c + (t(1 - a) + v(a,τ ) a)θ ]Q       (4a)
Thus, v(a,τ )aθ Q defines total abatement costs, while (1 – a)tθ Q is the emission
tax burden.  Section 4 describes the properties of the pollution abatement technology
in more detail.  However, at this stage we note that the technologies defined as τ  ∈  [1,
T], are distinguished by the fact that higher values of τ  correspond to equipment with
lower marginal and total abatement costs (i.e. ∂ v/∂τ  < 0).  Hence, the abatement
technologies with higher values of τ  may be regarded as more cost effective and
efficient.  We further assume that ∂ v/∂ a > 0, ∂
2v/∂ a
2 > 0 and ∂ v/∂τ  < 0, ∂
2v/(∂ a∂τ ) < 0.
Thus, pollution abatement costs rise with the degree of abatement at an increasing
rate, and decline with more efficient technologies.9
In an attempt to minimise its tax burden, the polluting firm offers political
contributions S(t) to the government.  These contributions are contingent upon the tax
rate which is set by the government.  Thus, profits are defined as
xii:
) t ( S ) t ), , a ( v , c , Q ( C Q ) Q ( P − τ − = Π (4b)




2 < 0  (4c)
We begin by solving the final stage of the game in which output levels are
determined.  Taking the tax and contribution schedules as given, equilibrium output is
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+  =  (t(1 - a) + v(a,τ )a)θ  (4d)
Let Q
e denote the solution to (4d) in equilibrium.
Clearly, abatement levels will be chosen to minimise costs, given knowledge
of the emission tax rate (t) and abatement costs (v(a,τ )).  Thus, for a given level of
output, the degree of abatement (a) is determined by the solution to:
Min
a
 C(Q,c, v(a,τ ),t) =  [c + (t(1 - a) + v(a,τ ) a)θ ]Q (5a)
The associated first-order condition is:
0 ) t v a
a
v




Equation (5b) summarizes the familiar result that abatement will occur up to the point






, equal the tax rate (t).  Let a
e denote
the solution to (5b).  We note that with an emission tax of t, total pollution emissions
are given by:10
E(t) = (1 – a
e)θ Q
e,( 5 c )




For future reference, the following well known properties of the equilibrium






Equation (6a) reveals that higher taxes result in lower equilibrium output levels.  This
occurs because the tax raises production costs and induces the firm to reduce
production levels.
In addition, higher emission taxes lead to an increase in the degree of






Intuitively, an increase in the tax rate raises the costs of emitting pollution, and thus
renders pollution abatement more attractive.
Finally, a rise in pollution abatement costs (v) leads to a decline in output
levels, as a consequence of higher production costs:
0





Equations (6a) and (6b) imply that higher emission taxes always lead to a
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< .  For
future reference we note that, since A(t) = a
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A necessary condition for 
dE(t)
dt











 > 0, which
implies that total abatement levels increase with higher taxes.  This property is used in
some of the proofs below.
3.  THE POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
Having defined the equilibrium output and abatement levels, we now consider
the manner in which political contributions are determined.  The political contribution
schedule offered by the firm is contingent on the tax rate chosen by the government
(see [18]).  The firm will choose its political contributions (S(t)) to maximise profits:
e e e
) t ( S
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 - 1 = 0 (7b)
  The government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of the political
contributions it receives and aggregate social welfare.  Social welfare gross-of
contributions, is given by the sum of profits, consumers’ surplus, pollution tax
revenues and the damage suffered from pollution emissions:12
W ≡   tQ ) a 1 ( ) E ( D Q ) t ) a 1 ( a ) , a ( v c ( dQ ) Q ( P
Q
0
θ − + − θ − + θ τ + − (7c)
To ensure that a unique maximum exists it is supposed that ∂
2W/∂ Q
2 < 0.  For future
reference the welfare maximizing level of output is defined as:
Q* = Argmax W (7d)
Let E* = (1 – a*)θ Q* be the associated level of pollution at the welfare maximising
output level (Q*).  Let t* be the emission tax required to achieve output level Q* and
define W* as the resulting (maximal) level of welfare at Q*.
Following Grossman and Helpman [18], the government is assumed to derive
utility from lobby group contributions and social welfare. Specifically the
government’s objective function is given by a weighted sum of political contributions
and social welfare.
G(t) = S(t)  + α W(t) (8a)
where  α  is the weight given to aggregate social welfare relative to political
contributions (S(t)).
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a contribution schedule
(S(t)) and a tax policy (t
L), such that: (i) the contribution schedule is feasible; (ii) the
policy t
L maximizes the government’s welfare,  ) t ( G , taking the contribution schedule
as given.
From Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston [6] the following necessary
conditions yield a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium {S,t
L}:
t
L ∈  Argmax G(t) = S(t) + α W(t); (SI)
t
L ∈  Argmax  ) t ( G ) t ( + Π (SII)13
Condition (SI) asserts that the equilibrium tax t
L must maximize the government’s
payoff, given the contribution schedule offered.  Condition (SII) requires that t
L must
also maximize the joint payoff of the firm and the government.  If this condition is not
satisfied, the firm will have an incentive to alter its strategy to induce the government
to change the tax rate, and capture close to all the surplus.  Maximizing (SI) and (SII),
and performing the appropriate substitutions, yields the equilibrium contribution
schedule of the lobby group which satisfies:




























Thus, as noted by Grossman and Helpman [18], the political contribution schedule is
locally truthful.  As in Bernheim and Whinston [6], this concept can be extended to a
contribution schedule that is globally truthful.  This yields a function which accurately
represents the preferences of the lobbyist for all feasible t.
It is worth briefly outlining an important property of this equilibrium which
has been frequently overlooked in the literature.  Equation (7b) defines the profit
maximising contributions of the firm.  If the tax schedule is monotonic in
contributions, then its inverse exists so that (7b) can be rearranged to yield:
t
) t ( S





= θ − − (8c)
Observe that (8c) is precisely the subgame perfect equilibrium condition of the
political game which has been defined in equation (8b).  This equivalence implies that14
the individually rational (Nash) contributions which maximise a firm's profits (i.e.
(7b)), are equal to the contributions necessary for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
political game (i.e. (8b)).  More significantly, it can be demonstrated that this result
generalizes to the case of a lobby group with n > 1 firms.  That is, if each firm takes
the contribution levels of its rivals’ as given, its Nash contribution will satisfy
condition (8b).  This implies that the subgame perfect political equilibrium does not
require contributions from firms in a lobby group beyond the individually rational
level.  Thus lobbying is not constrained by free-riding in this model. 
xiii
Having determined the slope of the contribution schedule, it is necessary to
derive an expression for the level of contributions in a political equilibrium.
Grossman and Helpman demonstrate that with one lobby group, the equilibrium
contribution to the government is defined by the difference in social welfare, when the




L) = α (W* - W
L)( 9 )
Where: W* is the level of social welfare which eventuates when the tax is set at the
welfare maximising rate t* and W
L is the level of social welfare when the tax is set at
the political equilibrium rate t
L.
Observe that α (W* - W
L) defines the loss of utility to the government when
the tax rate deviates from the welfare maximising level.  Equation (9) informs us that
political contributions perfectly compensate the government for the welfare loss
associated with participation of the lobby group in the political process.  The welfare
loss is weighted by the factor α  in order to adjust for its importance in the
government’s objective function.15
Having described the political equilibrium, we now examine the consequences
of varying pollution abatement costs (v) on political contributions.  Lemma 1 outlines
the circumstances under which an increase in abatement costs results in lower political
contributions.
Lemma 1:  An increase in abatement costs induces the firm to lower its
political contributions.
(i.e. 
) , a ( dv




This result reflects the fact that an increase in abatement costs makes pollution
control more difficult and therefore undermines the government’s ability to limit
emissions.  Since a given tax now yields a smaller benefit to the government, the
polluter needs to spend less on lobbying and political contributions decline.
Having determined the impact of abatement costs on contributions, we
explore the effects of varying abatement costs on the tax rate in a political
equilibrium.  The result is summarised in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in abatement costs leads to a lower emission
tax being set in the political equilibrium.
(i.e. 




Proof:  By condition (SI) t
















L denote the corresponding level of social welfare at the political equilibrium
tax rate t
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But by (9) S = α (W* - W







Differentiating W with respect to v in (7c):
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Intuitively, this result may be explained as follows.  From equation (8b) we
know that political donations are truthful, in the sense that they reflect the change in
the firm’s payoffs which results from a change in the tax rate.  An increase in
abatement costs makes pollution control more expensive for the firm.  Thus, as
abatement costs rise, profits and political contributions tend to fall.  A government
which values political donations, has an incentive to adopt policies which mitigate the
decline in profits and political donations.  To maintain contribution levels, the
government therefore lowers the emission tax rate.
This result has important policy implications.  It suggests that, if firms can
credibly commit to higher abatement costs in earlier stages of the game, they can
potentially rig in their own favour the policy outcome in the ensuing political17
equilibrium.  The next Section deals with the circumstances in which technology can
be used as a credible commitment device.
4. TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
Having explored the impact of abatement costs on contribution levels, this
Section investigates the manner in which political lobbying influences the firm's choice
of pollution abatement technology.  We begin by defining the properties of the
available pollution abatement technologies.
Let τ  ∈  [1, T] ⊂  ℜ + 
 be the continuum of existing pollution abatement
technologies.  The technologies in τ  are distinguished by their associated abatement
costs.  Specifically, there exists a one-to-one mapping from the set of technologies (τ )
to the abatement costs associated with each technology (v(a, τ )).  It is assumed that
0
a
) , a ( v
 that  and   0  
) , a ( v
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.  Thus, the technologies in τ  are
ranked in terms of their efficiency.  They are identified by the fact that higher values
of τ  correspond to equipment which embodies lower total and marginal abatement
costs.  The cost of purchasing equipment associated with a given technology of type τ
∈  [1, T] is given by K(τ ).  It is assumed that K(τ ) is a sunk cost and that 
τ ∂
τ ∂ ) ( K
 > 0,
2
2 ) ( K
τ ∂
τ ∂
 >0.  This implies that the efficient technologies, which abate pollution more
cheaply, are more expensive to purchase.
For future reference we note that totally differentiating abatement costs v(a,τ ),
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τ
τ
 <0.  This ensures that greater investment in technology always lowers
overall pollution abatement costs, so that even with lobbying there is a strong
(abatement cost saving) motive to invest in cleaner technologies.
xiv
The firm will choose a type of pollution abatement technology (τ ) to maximise
profits.  Thus:
ee e e e ˆ     (P(Q ) c v(a , )a (1 a ) t)Q S(t) K( ) Max
τ
Π= − − τ θ− − θ − − τ (11a)





K( ) v(a , ) dS v(a , )
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=− θ −
∂τ ∂τ τ ∂τ
 (11b)
The firm will acquire the type of equipment (τ ) at which the marginal cost of
purchasing a more efficient technology (
τ ∂
τ ∂ ) ( K
)  is set equal to: (i) the marginal
benefits (in the form of cost savings) from this technology (
e






the benefits which arise from the need to lobby less as v rises (
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Lobbying and the choice of technology are therefore substitutes in the firm's profit
function.
xvi  Observe that in the absence of lobbying firms would simply equate the
marginal cost of acquiring a more efficient technology to the marginal benefits (in the
form of cost savings) from the equipment. This suggests that lobbying may induce
firms to underinvest in pollution abatement technology.  The circumstances under
which this occurs are summarised with greater accuracy in the following Proposition.19
Define the choice of technology
  under lobbying as:








Define the choice of technology  in the absence of lobbying as:
Argmax (P(Q) c v(a, )a (1 a) t)Q K( ) τ∈ Π≡ − − τ θ− − θ − τ      
Where:   ) t , ~ ( a a ~ ), t , ~ ( Q Q
~
τ = τ =
PROPOSITION 2: If the abatement costs associated with less efficient technologies
are sufficiently high, then lobbying lowers the level of investment in pollution
abatement technology.
       (i.e. τ
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When firms lobby from equation (11b) the associated first order condition is:
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τ ∂ ) ( K
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>0).  Thus the FOCs in (I) and (II) will be satisfied when the right hand side
of (II) is less than that of (I).  That is:
dL L L L
















) a ~ 1 (
) ~ , a ~ ( v
Q
~
a ~      (III)
Since 
τ ∂
τ ∂ ) , a ( v
 < 0 and 
dS
dv(a, ) τ
 < 0, then, 





 < 0.  It follows that




) , a ( v
Q a
L L
L L  >  )
t
) a ~ 1 (
) ~ , a ~ ( v








Proposition 2 formalises the natural condition that underinvestment in
technology acts as a credible commitment device, if less efficient technologies are
associated with sufficiently high abatement costs.  When this condition is satisfied,
underinvestment provides a credible signal to the government that more stringent
environmental regulations will result in lower profits.  Since political contributions are
linked to profits, a decline in profits leads to a fall in political donations.
   A
government which values political contributions is therefore induced to adopt a more
favourable policy towards firms.
In a sequential game, lobbying leads to sub-optimal levels of investment for
two distinct reasons.
   Firstly as noted earlier, political contributions and technology
choice are substitutes in the profit function.  Thus, any positive level of lobbying will
necessarily lead to a decline in investment.  More importantly, in a sequential game
investment also acts as a credible commitment device, which induces a further
reduction in investment.
xvii  In order to isolate the commitment component of
underinvestment, we compare the investment level in a game when technology and
contributions are simultaneously chosen, with investment levels in a sequential game
when technology is chosen first and contributions later (as in the present model).  The
commitment effect is then given by the difference in investment in a sequential game
as defined in equation (11b) (τ
L), and that in a simultaneous game (denoted τ
i).
We begin by defining the equilibrium when contributions and technology
choice are simultaneously determined by the firm.  In a simultaneous game,
equilibrium contributions and technology levels are given by the solution to:
i
S(t),
    (P(Q) c v(a, )a (1 a) t)Q S(t) K( ) Max
τ
Π= −− τ θ − − θ − − τ (12a)
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ii v(a , ) S t v K( )
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tv
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∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂τ ∂τ
(12c)
where superscript i denotes terms in the simultaneous equilibrium
Let S
i(t), τ
i denote the solutions to the system in (12b) and (12c).
PROPOSITION 3:  The level of investment in abatement technology in a sequential
game (τ




L  - τ
i ) < 0).
Proof:  See Appendix.
Proposition 3 reveals that there is less investment when technology and
lobbying are determined sequentially, than when they are chosen simultaneously.  This
reflects the first mover advantage in a sequential game which allows the firm to use
investment as a commitment device.  Underinvestment in the first stage of the game
provides a credible signal to the government that higher taxes will result in lower
profits and a fall in political contributions.  A government which values political
donations is thus deterred from raising emission taxes.  In the parlance of Fudenberg
and Tirole [16] the firm adopts the “puppy dog” strategy: it underinvests in abatement
technology in order to induce a less hostile reaction in succeeding stages of the game.
Finally for completeness, we compare the level of investment in a sequential
game with the welfare maximising level of investment.  Recall that welfare is defined
as the sum of: profits, consumers’ surplus, pollution tax revenues and the damage
suffered from pollution emissions.  Consider a situation where technology levels are22
chosen to maximise welfare.  In the Appendix it is demonstrated that the welfare
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where * is used to denote terms in the welfare maximising equilibrium
Let τ
* be the solution to (13).
Proposition 4   If abatement costs associated with less efficient technologies are
sufficiently high, then the welfare maximising level of investment (τ *) exceeds the level
of investment undertaken by a private firm in the sequential lobbying equilibrium (τ
L).
(i.e. τ *  > τ
L if 
LL L
LL vv * t * d a * d S ( t ) v
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Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 4 summarises the usual condition that if abatement costs decline
sufficiently with investment, then investment levels in the welfare maximising
equilibrium exceed those in the lobbying equilibrium.
xviii
  These results have significant implications for environmental control.  They
suggest that there exist circumstances in which firms have an incentive to eschew
more efficient technologies in order to obtain greater policy concessions.
5.  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Encouraging the adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology is an
important environmental policy objective.  However, the existing literature appears to
have neglected the effects of lobbying on the choice of technology.  Accordingly, this
paper has attempted to examine the manner in which political factors influence
investment decisions.  The central message is that when governments are receptive to23
special interest group pressures, political considerations may provide an incentive for
firms to reject cost saving investments in pollution abatement.  If abatement costs are
sufficiently high, underinvestment in new abatement technology provides a credible
signal to the government that profits and political donations will decline if stringent
environmental taxes are introduced.  A government which values political
contributions is therefore induced to adopt a more favourable policy towards firms.
Hence, industries with older and more polluting technologies are better placed to
secure policy concessions.
While the analysis in this paper has been conducted in terms of an emission
tax, the results apply to other regulatory instruments which increase the costs of
emissions.  Any policy which makes pollution more expensive for the firm, will
induce underinvestment in technology if the government is known to be receptive to
special interest groups.  This occurs because underinvestment credibly signals to the
government that more stringent regulations will lead to a decline in political
donations.  It is important to note that these results simply indicate that less efficient
industries may be more successful in securing concessions if abatement costs are
sufficiently high.  The analysis does not suggest that stringent regulatory policies, if
introduced, will be ineffective in controlling pollution.
The model can also be applied to other forms of lobbying.  An issue which has
received considerable attention in recent years is the success of declining industries in
securing trade protection and income support (see Baldwin [4], Grossman and
Helpman ([19]). Our analysis suggests that by remaining technologically inefficient,
these industries can raise the welfare costs of reform, and are thus able to lobby more
effectively for protection.24
The mechanisms outlined in this paper are new and have therefore not been
statistically validated.  Direct empirical tests would necessitate analyzing the effects of
investment, lobbying and pollution intensity on the stringency of environmental
policy.  In the absence of such econometric work, there is only indirect support for the
predictions of this model from studies that have examined other hypotheses.  For
instance, the growing empirical literature on trade protection suggests that older “rust
belt” industries receive greater protection and support than do the less polluting
“sunrise” industries in developed economies.  Many of these older industries tend to
be highly polluting and include: metals, chemicals and mineral products (Mani and
Wheeler [25] classify these as amongst the most pollution intensive).
 xix   In a more
direct test of pollution intensive industries and trade protection in LDCs, Hettige et al
[20] find that countries with more toxic intensive manufacturing sectors, provide
greater protection to these industries.  These findings are consistent with the
conclusions of this model that more polluting industries often garner greater policy
concessions.
Further indirect statistical support for the results are provided by Eliste and
Fredriksson [14] in an econometric study of environmental policy in the agricultural
sector.  They find that the greater is the impact of the environmental degradation
variables, the higher is the level of government compensation, which neutralizes the
effects of more stringent environmental regulations.  Eliste and Fredriksson interpret
their results as implying that high polluters obtain greater support through more
effective lobbying.  The authors conclude that:
“One possibility of our results is that the combination of environmental policies
and associated transfers may in the aggregate worsen environmental quality…”25
This finding also appears to accord with a central implication of the model that high
polluters may receive favourable treatment.  Others support for the model can be
found in case studies.  For instance, Leidy and Hoekman [23] provide examples of
industries in the USA and EU with high pollution abatement costs, which have sought
and obtained greater trade protection.  While none of these studies provide a direct
statistical test of the mechanisms outlined in this paper, the evidence appears to be
broadly consistent with the central predictions.  What remains to be tested in future
empirical research is the role of investment and lobbying on the degree of regulation.
There are a number of other important issues that have not been considered.
The results in this paper depend critically on the assumed sequence of events.  The
credible commitment effects stem from the assumption that firms determine their
investment first and the government chooses its policy taking the investment decision
as given.  This seems reasonable if it is supposed that investment in technology is a
long run decision variable, while the details of government policies are influenced by
lobby group pressures and more immediate (short term) political concerns
xx.  If,
however, firms delay their investment decisions so that the sequence of events is
reversed, then investment can no longer have a credible commitment effect.  Clearly,
delaying investments would be the rational strategy for firms which confront a
government which is not receptive to special interest group pressures.  Similarly,
postponing investment would also be rational for a firm if there is considerable
uncertainty about the government’s responses and the payoffs from lobbying.
Formally, this could be modeled as a signaling game in which the government’s
"type" is not known to the lobbyists.  Whether firms  precommit to technology, or
choose to postpone investment, is an issue which is perhaps best resolved empirically.
The present model predicts that where a government is known to be receptive to26
interest group lobbying, precommitment would be the optimal strategy.  Thus, an
empirical test of the timing of investment and policy decisions may provide some
evidence of a government’s receptiveness to lobby group pressures.
xxi
Another issue which has been ignored is the public good aspect of investment
in an industry lobby group.
xxii  If there is more than one firm in the lobby group, it is
possible that underinvestment may have credible commitment value only if most firms
in the lobby group eschew the efficient technologies.  In this situation, it could pay
each firm to defect and invest in cleaner technology, so long as its rivals do not.  The
defecting firm would thus benefit from the lower tax, without contributing to it
through underinvestment.  In this situation, the underinvestment equilibrium could be
sustained in one of two ways.  First, as is well known, if firms in the lobby group
interact over an indefinite period of time, various forms of cooperation (e.g.
underinvestment) can be sustained if discount rates are sufficiently low.  However, in
a finite period game, the underinvestment equilibrium could be sustained through the
local truthfulness property of the political equilibrium.  Recall that each firm donates
to the government the "locally truthful" contribution.  Thus, firms which adopt cleaner
technologies are less affected by a pollution tax, and by "local truthfulness" will
contribute less to the government.  Since the "clean" firms contribute less, in
equilibrium they receive fewer concessions.  In essence, these "clean "firms represent
a different lobby group to those who underinvest and they therefore receive a different
set of policy concessions.  However, this equilibrium which involves asymmetric





From equation (4d) we know that in equilibrium Q
e solves the first-order condition:
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The sign of (A3) follows from the fact that the denominator is negative by (4c) and
(1 – a)θ  > 0.
Equation 6b
From equation (5b) in equilibrium, a
e solves the first-order condition:
e Cv
Q( a v t) 0
aa
∂∂

































 > 0 (A7)
The sign of (A7) follows from the fact that 
22 C/ a 0 ∂∂ >  and θ Q > 0.
Equation 6c
Similarly totally differentiating the first-order condition (4d):









 < 0. (A9)
The sign of (A9) follows from the fact that the denominator is negative by (4c) and
aθ  > 0.
Lemma 1:
From (7c) welfare is given by:28
W ≡  
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Differentiating with respect to v:
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From equation (9), S = α (W* - W
L).  Differentiating S with respect to v, using (A12)
and (A14):
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Rearranging, using the fact that A = aθ Q:
LL
L dS dW dQ
((A A*) ( ))
dv dQ dv




> 0, and t* > t
L, it follows that A* > A
L.  Hence (A
L – A*) < 0.




> .  From (6a) we know that, 
dQ
dt
<0, and t* > t
L thus
Q* < Q




= , (ii) it has been shown that Q* < Q
L, and






















In a simultaneous equilibrium the levels of lobbying and technology are defined by the
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where superscript i is used to identify terms in the simultaneous equilibrium.
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i denote the solution in the simultaneous equilibrium.  Let τ
L be the solution in
sequential game as defined in equation (11b).
Suppose that τ
L ≥  τ



















τ ∂ ) ( K ) ( K
i i L
(A20)
For (A20) to hold requires that:
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The sign of (A24) follows from the fact that: (i) 
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Welfare is defined as:30
W ≡  
Q
0
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.  Using (11b) and (A29), this requires that:
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ENDNOTES
                                                
i ElAgraa [13] provides evidence based on inter industry studies. Some industry specific examples are:
textiles (Dixit and Londregan [11]) and agriculture (Anderson [2]).
ii  For example, by 1980 a sizeable proportion (84%) of the US steel industry continued to employ the
open-hearth furnace (based on 19
th century technology), two decades after Japanese firms had adopted
the energy efficient, continuous casting techniques (Dertouzos et al [10]).  Other cases of the slow
adoption of cost saving environmental technologies are provided in DeCanio [6], Parkinson [26],and
Dorfman et al [12].  A more extreme, and perhaps less typical, example is that of the timber industry
where logging operators in Indonesia constructed tracks through pristine forests, even where existing
roads provided a cheaper and more direct route to the saw mills (Rainforest News (June, 1996)).
iii  For simplicity, the analysis focuses on a monopoly.  However, the results generalize to the case of a
polluting oligopoly.
iv   Since the focus of the Grossman Helpman model is on the short run determinants of policy, it is
assumed that the incumbent government sets its policy, taking as given the capital stock (investment
decision) of the firm, which is assumed to be a long run decision variable.
v  It is assumed that capital costs are sunk.
vi  Recall that a profit maximising firm abates pollution up to the point where the marginal abatement
cost equals the tax rate.  As marginal abatement costs rise firms abate less pollution per unit of output.
vii  I am grateful to a referee for emphasizing the significance of this issue.
viii  As noted by a referee, this may partly explain the relatively low energy prices in some economies
such as the USA and the slow adoption of energy saving technology in certain energy intensive sectors.
ix  For a recent example see Jung et al [22].
x  This formulation implies that we can ignore income effects and  perform partial equilibrium analysis.
xi   The main conclusions hold so long as pollution is convex in output levels.  However, a more general
pollution technology function considerably complicates the proofs.
xii  As in Grossman and Helpman (op cit) for expositional ease we separate lobbying costs from
production costs in the profit function.
xiii Free-riding does not prevent lobbying in the model because the political equilibrium is sustained by
the profit maximising (Nash) contributions of each firm. With the exception of Goldberg and Maggi
[17], this issue appears to have been overlooked in the literature and it has generally been assumed that
lobbying can be undermined by free-riding in this model.  Moreover, the political equilibrium is
identical whether the lobbyists are assumed to be "groups" representing an entire industry or simply the
firms acting individually. Intuitively, this follows directly from the local truthfulness condition (8b).
For formal proofs see Damania [8].  If, however, there are fixed costs associated with lobbying, and
there is more than one firm who shares these costs, the problem becomes similar to that of the private
provision of a discrete public good.  Since the focus of this paper is on strategic investment issues rather
than free-riding in lobby groups, these important issues are ignored for brevity.
xiv   Eschewing this assumption does not alter the results, but does appear to weaken the argument for
underinvestment.  That is, if more investment does not always lower abatement costs, firms may have
little reason to acquire cleaner technologies.
xv  By the envelope theorem we can ignore the indirect effect of τ  on profits through changes in output
and abatement levels.  That is: (∂Π /∂ Q)(∂ Q/∂ v)(∂ v/∂τ ) = 0 since (∂Π /∂ Q) = 0, similarly (∂Π /∂ a)(∂ a/∂τ )
= 0 since equation (5b) implies that (∂Π /∂ a) = -(∂ C/∂ a) = 0.  Thus differentiation of (11a) yields:
ee e v Sv Stv tv K
aQ ( 1a ) Q 0
vt v v
∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
θ − − −−θ − =
∂ τ ∂∂ τ ∂∂∂ τ ∂∂ τ ∂ τ
.  However, from equation (8b) we know that:
Q ) a 1 (
t
S
θ − − =
∂
∂
.  Using this result, yields the first order condition in (11b).
xvi  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the relevance of this relationship.
xvii  Recall that underinvestment credibly signals to the government that political contributions will
decline with higher taxes.
xviii So long as τ * ≠  τ
L welfare will always be lower in the lobbying equilibrium.
xix  Baldwin [3] provides a comprehensive survey of protection.  More specific studies include Hufbauer
et al [21] for the USA, and Anderson and Garnaut [1] for Australia.  These surveys suggest that metals,
chemicals and minerals are amongst the more heavily protected sectors. A direct comparison in terms of
the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is informative.  Using estimates of protection from the GTAP434
                                                                                                                                           
Data Base ([24]), the more pollution intensive industries, chemicals, minerals and metals (Mani and
Wheeler ([25]), have an average ERP of 0.05 in the USA and 0.15 in the EU.  In contrast, the three
least pollution intensive manufacturing industries: transport equipment, electric equipment and
machinery equipment (Mani and Wheeler [25]) have an average ERP in the USA of 0.03 and in the EU
of 0.11.
xx   This is one of the central assumptions of the Grossman-Helpman model.  It defines the short run
political equilibrium, taking longer term considerations as given.
xxi  In the  Grossman-Helpman model, this would provide indirect evidence of the size of α , the weight
given to social welfare in the government’s objective function.
xxii  I am grateful to a referee for identifying this interesting issue.
xxiii  Equilibrium superscripts are ignored where not necessary for notational convenience.













0 (by (A6)) ,  Q(a ) 0
aa a
∂∂ ∂ ∂
>= θ + <











da C/( a )
0
d C/ a
∂∂ ∂ τ
=− >
τ ∂∂
.